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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 










LIFE OF THE SOUTH INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY and INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
OF THE SOUTH, ) 
) 
) 
MARQUETTA CARZELL, LUELLA 
CARTER, and GLADYS CHEGE, On 
Behalf of Themselves and All Others 
Similarly Situated, 
Plaintiffs, Civil Action File No. 2015CV264252 
v. 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO ADD PARTY 
Before this COUli is Defendants' Motion to Add Party Needed for Just Adjudication. 
Having considered the Motion and the response thereto, the COUli finds as follows: 
This is a purported class action brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and others 
who purchased insurance products related to installment loans. The insurance products, including 
life, disability, unemployment, death and dismemberment, and property (mainly, auto) insurance 
policies, were issued by Defendants Life of the South Insurance Company and Insurance 
Company of the South. However, the policies were sold to consumers (and sometimes required) 
by installment lenders like non-party, World Finance Corporation ("World"), the United States' 
largest provider of installment loans.' Plaintiffs allege World acted as Defendants' agent in 
selling these policies and received a commission. The purported class alleges that Defendants' 
insurance products were overpriced because Defendants paid commissions or "kickbacks" to 
installment lenders like World out of the up-front premiums. For some insurance products, the 
I While the Complaint limits its class allegations to policies sold by World as Defendants' agent, the Complaint 
argues that discovery may support extending the class beyond World customers. 
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commissions accounted for more than 70% of the total premium assessed. The premiums were 
often financed as a part of the loan. The purported class also asserts Defendants have violated 
the terms ofthe insurance contracts and Georgia's insurance laws. Specifically, they assert (1) 
Defendants have not paid refunds directly to customers when they renew their loans but instead 
apply the refunds to new insurance policies; (2) Defendants have set premiums that are not 
reflective of the values of the policies; and (3) Defendants have enforced unconscionable policies 
that provide worthless or redundant coverage (e.g., auto insurance policies for automobiles held 
as collateral for loans even though the automobile is already fully covered under a separate 
policy). Finally, the Complaint alleges that the insurance agreements are procedurally 
unconscionable because Defendants and their agents (including World) required borrowers to 
sign insurance contracts without an opportunity to review or negotiate the terms, added policies 
without the consumers' knowing consent, and made misrepresentations about the cost and 
benefits of the policies and whether the policies were optional. 
The purported class claims (1) breach of contract, including the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, (2) unconscionability, (3) unjust enriclunent, (4) negligence, and (5) bad faith. 
Plaintiffs have expressly stated in their Complaint that the lawsuit does not challenge World's 
installment loan agreements with the class members or its actions as a lender. Plaintiffs seek 
relief including: actual, incidental, and punitive damages, disgorgement of all benefits derived by 
Defendants from members of the purported class, and a declaration that Defendants' practices 
are unlawful and should be enjoined. 
Defendants argue World is a necessary party and should be joined as a defendant. Under 
Georgia law: 
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the 
action if: 
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(1) In his absence complete relief cannot be afforded among those who are 
already parties; or 
(2) He claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 
the disposition of the action in his absence may: 
(A) As a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest; 
or 
(B) Leave any of the persons who are already parties subject to a substantial 
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by 
reason of his claimed interest. 
O.e.G.A. § 9-11-19(a). In Georgia, the Court of Appeals has held that an insurance agent was 
an indispensable party in a case brought by an insured against an insurer. See S. Farm Bureau 
Life Ins. Co. v. Douglas, 193 Ga. App. 476,476 (l989) (holding trial court erred in denying 
insurer's motion for joinder). In the Douglas case, the insurance agent told an insured the cash 
value of his life insurance policy was far higher than the amount he ultimately received after 
cancelling his policy. Jd. The insured alleged the agent and his employees fraudulently took 
loans against the insured's policy, which depleted the policy's cash value. Jd. Without 
discussion, the Court of Appeals held that the agent was an indispensable party after applying the 
two essential tests under Rule 19: "( 1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of 
the other party? (2) can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the 
other party?" Jd. 
In contrast, Plaintiffs cite two federal court cases applying the nearly identical federal 
rule on joinder. In these cases, the Courts have held that agents are not indispensable parties to 
lawsuits against the principal because agents do not have separate interests from their principals. 
In Milligan v. Anderson, 522 F.2d 1202, 1204-5 (lOth Cir. 1975), the Tenth Circuit held that an 
agent was not a necessary party in a lawsuit seeking to rescind contracts between plaintiffs and 
principal and to recover amounts paid to the principal. While the agent negotiated the contracts, 
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he was not a party to them and therefore did not have a personal interest. Id. at 1205. The Court 
was not persuaded that the agent had a personal interest because he was paid a finder's fee out of 
plaintiffs' payments, noting the finder's fee was a matter strictly between principal and agent. 
Id. In Pasco Int'l (London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1980), the Seventh 
Circuit similarly found that an agent was not an indispensable party in a lawsuit against his 
principal. The Court held that the possibility of injunctive relief against the principal would not 
result in impermissible prejudice to the agent. Id. at 501. The Court noted that the rules 
pertaining to injunctive relief which bind the parties and their officers, agents, employees, etc., 
contemplate that agents need not be patties in a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief against the 
principal. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)). Likewise, the Court found the agent would not be 
prejudiced by a monetary award against the principal because the agent could still assert defenses 
in any subsequent indemnity or contribution action. Id. at 501-02; see also Nottingham v. Gen. 
Am. Comm. Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rule 19 does not require the joinder of 
joint tortfeasors, agents, or parties against whom parties have a contribution claim); Chaney v. 
Harrison & Lyman, LLC, 308 Ga. App. 808 (2011) (joint tortfeasors are not indispensable 
parties). 
The COUlt agrees with the reasoning of the federal courts in finding that agents are not 
generally necessary parties in lawsuits against their principals. While the Georgia Court of 
Appeals did not elaborate on the facts in Douglas, the allegation that the insurance agent took 
loans on the insured's policy without the insured's knowledge or consent distinguishes that case 
from the case at hand. Presumably, such wrongdoing was outside the scope of the agency 
relationship. Here, Plaintiffs have presented prima facie evidence that World was acting as an 
agent of Defendants-World acknowledged in its own SEC disclosures that it was an agent for 
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an unaffiliated insurance company and marketed and sold insurance products in certain states. 
Thus, as a purported agent of Defendants, World is not a necessary party. A careful analysis of 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19 and the facts of this particular case lead to the same conclusion. 
1. Can World adequately protect its interests in the absence of joinder (O.C.G.A. § 
9-11-19( a)(2)(A))? 
The Court finds that World can adequately protect its interests without being joined as a 
defendant. While Defendants argue World cannot defend itself as an alleged active participant in 
a kickback scheme, the Complaint makes clear that World was allegedly acting as Defendants' 
agent and was under their control supervision with no independent decision-making authority. 
World's own SEC disclosures identify World as an agent. As Defendants' agent, World was not 
an independent actor but a mere instrumentality of Defendants. Thus, World has no independent 
interests to protect as it was not acting independently. 
It is possible that other litigation may ensue if the Court determines that Defendants' 
insurance products are procedurally or substantively unconscionable. For instance, Defendants 
might seek to recover prior paid commissions from World or World may seek to enforce or set 
aside its separate contract with Defendants entitling it to commissions. However, World will be 
able to assert any claims or defenses at that time in that separate lawsuit. As noted by the court 
in Pasco, World could assert defenses in an indemnity or contribution action and therefore its 
rights would not be prejudiced. 
Defendants speculate that an adverse decision in this Court would impact World's ability 
to collect commissions from sales of insurance policies provided by Defendants as well as other 
insurance providers. However, the Complaint is asserting that the insurance premiums charged 
by Defendants are too high, not that it is unlawful for Defendants to payor for World to accept 
commissions. 
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Finally, Defendants allege the contracts between World and its borrowers requiring 
insurance would be affected. A finding that Defendants' policies or the premiums charged are 
unconscionable would not preclude World from requiring that its borrowers purchase 
insurance-it would only preclude it from marketing and selling unconscionable policies as 
Defendants' agent. 
2. Will Defendants be subjected to substantial risk of inconsistent obligations 
(O.e.G.A. § 9-11-19(a)(2)(B))? 
Defendants argue they face a substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations 
because they are contractually obligated to pay commissions to World and this Court's 
determination will necessarily affect that contract. They argue that if World sued to enforce this 
separate contract, a different court could come to a different conclusion as to whether the 
commission payments required under the contract are lawful. This contract is not before the 
Court but presumably, Defendants are only required to pay World commissions when it sells an 
insurance product. If this Court enjoined the sale of certain insurance products then World 
would not earn commissions-no sales, no commissions. Furthermore, the issue in this case is 
whether the premiums were unconscionably high not whether commissions are lawful. 
Regardless, as noted above, Defendants would be entitled to present their defenses in a 
subsequent action brought by World. 
3. Can complete relief be afforded to Plaintiffs in the absence of World (O.C.G.A. § 
9-11-19(a)(l))? 
Plaintiffs seek monetary damages in the amount of the premiums paid. That a portion of 
the premiums ultimately went to pay commissions is irrelevant. "Complete relief as between the 
two original parties can be effected without giving consideration to a cause of action that either 
of the original parties may have against the third parties after the conclusion of the action 
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between the original parties." Peoples Bank of La Grange v. N Carolina Nat. Bank, 230 Ga. 
389,392 (1973); see also Pasco, supra. Further, a declaration that Defendants' practices are 
unlawful and should be enjoined would apply equally to Defendants' agents, and thus would 
provide complete relief. 
As such, the Motion to Add Party Needed for Just Adjudication is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this IfJ day of August, 2016. 
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